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Abstract
In this paper I examine how political violence is justified in the charter of the Islamic 
Resistance Movement (Hamas). Using the recent work done in the social psychological 
literature, I argue in the paper that the charter draws upon the Islamic history and memory
to authorize political violence; charter uses explicit construction of binary symbols and 
historical mythology to dehumanize the target of violence; and finally, the charter evokes 
shame—which lead to “humiliated fury”—through collective memory of humiliation, 
which then might make martyrdom attractive.  
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Islam and Political Violence: An Examination of the Covenant of the Islamic
Resistance Movement (Hamas) in Palestine
The Motto of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)1:
Allah is its Goal.
The Messenger is its Leader.
The Quran is its Constitution.
Jihad is its methodology, and
Death for the sake of Allah is its most coveted desire.
Religion and violence are no strangers. Although all religions claim to be fonts of peace 
and justice, even a cursory examination of human history will bear witness to the fact that
violence has always been part and parcel of different religions. For the Abhramic faiths—
Judaism, Christianity and Islam—too, violence has been an integral part of their 
existence. Sometimes this violence is used against another human; sometimes it used is 
against self. Since the rise of secularism in the West, there is this belief that violence in 
Western societies is not explained by references to religion, because the role of religion in
public life has declined. But when it comes to violence in the Islamic world, the violence 
is explained with reference to Islam itself. In some sense this is valid because in the 
Islamic world Islam is part of lived daily life in a fashion that is relatively different from 
1 Taken from the charter of the movement, as translated by Muhammad Maqdasi (1993, 124). Hamas means
“zeal”.
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the case with Christianity in the West. In the Islamic world the religion has not be 
privatized for the most part and therefore is supposed to have a deeper hold on the 
followers. Although Islam has always been portrayed as a violent religion in the West, in 
the past half century this depiction has taken a more dangerous turn. The creation of 
Israel and the wars between Israel and Arab countries began what was to become a trend 
of an almost automatic equation of Islam with violence. Then came the oil shocks, which 
lead to the demonization of Islam to unprecedented levels. The huge oil reserves in 
Muslim countries and the resultant political volatility any conflict in the Middle East 
caused in the international oil market only added to this mix. And now with the attacks on
American targets in the Middle East and the September 11 attack, Islam never had it so 
bad.
It is not easy to define violence and even more so to define political violence.  There have
been suggestions that violence could, in addition to physical, be symbolic or material. In 
fact, during the Cold War period the definition of political violence revolved around the 
damage to, among other things, property. But for out purposes here, it is the violence to 
physical body that is important. Johan Galtung (1980) comes close to providing a 
satisfactory definition of violence. Given that societies consist of actors that have a 
certain degree of autonomous consciousness and given that these actors pursue a certain 
strategy in mind to reach certain goals, direct violence, according to Galtung, can be 
conceptualized as violence-as-action (1980, 68). Human action here, in keeping with 
Alfred Schutz’s phenomenological framework, is understood as subjectively meaningful 
to the actor and oriented to the future (1988, 57). For the violence to be political, 
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according to Lupsha and Mackinnon, three criteria must be fulfilled: 1) targets must be 
representatives of state or symbols of state authority; 2) actions of violence must be 
meant to be more than just the instrumental destruction of the target; and 3) actions must 
be initiated in name of or by a group with a define interest. It makes sense here to not pay
too much attention to the first condition because political violence could very well be 
against anyone else than those connected with state or symbols of state.
Whether Islam is violent per se or not is a separate question than how Islam is used to 
justify political violence. It is with this second question that I am concerned in this paper. 
I am interested in looking at how Islam is used to justify political violence. My argument 
is that Islam is used as a source for constructing a religious symbolic environment that 
makes a sharp division between those who believe and those who are the enemies, by 
loading the present with historically rich symbolism; and that a memory of shame, 
humiliation plays an important role in it. Herbert Kelman, a social psychologist at 
Harvard, has done some pioneering work in examining how the ordinary Germans in the 
WWII were able to become part of mass atrocities. From this research, Kelman has come 
up with framework to explain how it is possible for people to become susceptible to use 
of violence. In Kelman’s (1973, 29-61) opinion, moral inhibitions against violent 
atrocities tend to be eroded once three condition are met, singly or together: 1) the 
violence is authorized (by official orders coming from the legally entitled quarters); 2) 
actions are routinized (by rule-governed practices); and 3) the victims of the violence are 
dehumanized (by ideological definitions and indoctrinations.) In this paper, I do not think
that I can examine the routinization of actions, because my paper is based upon the 
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charter and not actions of the movement. But I am arguing that in addition to these points,
it is important also to look at another point that is not present here: shame. I will therefore
focus on three points: authorization, dehumanization and shame. I will argue in the paper 
that the charter draws upon the Islamic history and memory to authorize political 
violence; charter uses explicit construction of binary symbols and historical mythology to
dehumanize the target of violence; and finally, the charter evokes shame—which lead to 
“humiliated fury”—through collective memory of humiliation, which then might make 
martyrdom attractive.2  
Hamas: A Brief Introduction
Hamas or the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas is actually an acronym for the 
Arabic name of the organization which translates to the Islamic Resistance Movement) 
was founded in 1987 after the beginning of the first intifada in the Israeli Occupied 
Territories. It began as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, a group founded in 1928 
in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna with the avowed goal of working toward establishing an 
Islamic state in Muslim countries3. Although the Muslim Brotherhood has been involved 
in Palestine since 1935 (Abu-Amr, 1994, 1), it was only after the beginning of the first 
intifada in 1987 that it began active opposition to the Israeli occupation. Ever since its 
foundation in the Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood faced trying circumstances, especially 
2 I wish to point out at the beginning that I am not arguing that anymore—even if they are very devoted to 
Islam—who reads the charter are prone to participate in acts of political violence. There are many variables
and concrete lived experiences that cannot just be pinned down in any dependable fashion. 
3 It is interesting to note that the other main Islamic group in Palestine, Islamic Jihad, is also an offshoot of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. It was established in 1980 by two 1948 refugees who broke away from the 
Brotherhood, though influenced by other Egyptian groups such as al-Takfir wa al-Hijra and Tandhim al-
Jihad that were themselves derived from the Brotherhood (Abu-Amr, 1993, 6 and 8).
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under the rule of Abdel Nasser who hanged a large number of Muslim Brothers, including
Sayyid Qutb, the author of Islamic radicals most venerable text, Signposts4. Given the 
totalitarian conditions faced by the Brotherhood, the leaders of the movement decided to 
avoid a direct confrontation with the state and shifted their focus to charity and 
educational work, in effect preparing grounds for changing the culture from bottom up 
(Kepel, 1983, ch.2).
In the Occupied Territories, the Brotherhood adopted a similar posture, with Shaykh 
Ahmad Yashin, the founder of Hamas and Brotherhood’s main representative in the 
Occupied Territories, focusing on educational and charity work, avoiding direct 
confrontation with the Israeli authority.5 But since an increasing number of followers 
began to leave the Brotherhood because of its inactivity against the Israeli occupation, a 
decision was made, after the beginning of the first intifada, to join the struggle against the
Israeli occupation in a more active fashion. Since then, Hamas has risen to become, along
with Arafat led Fateh, to be the main player in the Palestinian politics. Its increasing 
network of social service agencies and schools provide support for the poor in the West 
Bank and Gaza; and its militant wing—Kata’ib ‘Izz-al-Din al-Qassam—takes part in 
violent actions against Israel and its Palestinian collaborators. Hamas’s ideology and 
beliefs are codified in charter, which it issued on August 18, 1988 (Abu-Amr, 1994, 80). 
The charter states that the Islamic Resistance Movement is “a distinct Palestinian 
movement that gives allegiance to God, takes Islam as a way of life, and works to raise 
the banner of God over every inch of Palestine” (Maqdasi, 124). The goal of this 
4 Also translated under the title of Milestones.
5 There is ample evidence that Israel supported Hamas during the initial period of its existence, thinking 
that a growing Islamic movement will act as a counterweight to the secular PLO. But Israel withdrew its 
support soon after.
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movement in not different from that of the Muslim Brotherhood: the establishment of an 
Islamic state or, recalling Qutb, the establishment of the God as the sole sovereign. 
The Charter and Political Violence
The charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement codifies the ideology, beliefs and aims 
of the movement. Written in a flourishing style that combines hard-nosed political 
calculations of not dismissing nationalism of other Palestinian groups in its Islamic 
program, the document is interspersed with a number of Qur’anic suras and hadiths to 
establish religious sanction behind the content. These selections from Qur’an and hadiths,
furthermore, provoke a certain degree of sacredness, keeping the reader from just drifting
off and thinking of it as just another charter for a movement. According to Ziad Abu-
Amr, “the content of the charter does not differ from positions taken by the Muslim 
Brotherhood on the same issues” (1993, 12). In article two of the charter, Hamas declares
itself as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood society. In this sense it is important to look 
at the ideas of Muslim Brotherhood in understanding Hamas’s relationship with political 
violence. But while there are ample common grounds between the Brotherhood and 
Hamas, Abu-Amr points to one main difference in the charter: “the charter pays little 
attention to the Brotherhood’s core goal of transforming society, placing far greater 
emphasis on the Palestine problem and jihad” (Abu-Amr, 1993, 12). But this difference, I
would argue, can be explained away by pointing to the importance of the context, in the 
sense that it is not an either/or proposition for Hamas to focus on the Palestine problem at
the expense of societal change. In fact, I would argue that there is ample material in the 
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charter that aims, in addition to the solution of the Palestine problem, at the societal 
transition, too. The charter injunctions, for example, on the role of women in Palestine 
and the role of women in a future Islamic state are as much a call for action in the 
Palestinian context as much as they aimed at societal transformation.
The Muslim Brotherhood genesis of the ideology of Hamas is important for 
understanding the charter. In the Brotherhood nothing is more central to the ideology of 
the Muslim Brotherhood than the ideas of Sayid Qutb as expressed in Signposts. It is for 
this very reason that Egyptian intellectual Tariq al-Bishri declared it the What Is to Be 
Done? of the Islamicist movement (Kepel, 1984, 43). In this book, Qutb proposes a 
radical restructuring of world as it exists in his time. Qutb reached the conclusion that 
sovereignty (hakimiyya) only belongs to God only God6, and therefore he declares all the 
societies on the earth—whether capitalist West or communist East or avowedly Islamic 
societies—jahiliyya because: “Any society that is not Muslim is jahiliyya…as is any 
society in which something other than God alone is worshipped…. Thus, we must 
include in this category all the societies that now exist on earth!” (Qutb quoted in Kepel, 
1984, 47). For him the rebuilding of Islamic society, which has gone in decline since the 
time of first Qur’anic generation (1993,11-17), is to be done around the Islamic umma7. 
This rebuilding is to begin with the formation of a vanguard of people who would 
tactically withdraw from the jahiliyya society and wage a jihad to achieve the 
establishment of an Islamic state. 
6 This emphasis in Qutb comes from the works of Mawdudi, who deposited sovereignty in raab.
7 On this point Qutb departs from Hasan al-Banna’s understanding because al-Banna still considered the 
nation-state as an intermediary stage of action in the Islamic “long march through the institutions”.
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The ideological foundations of the Muslim Brotherhood and from there of the Hamas are 
well captured in the concept of jahiliyya. This concept is used both in Qutbs’ work and in 
Hamas’s charter8. In so far as the word itself is concerned, it is a Qu’ranic word (Kepel, 
1983, 63). It refers to the pre-Islamic times that are seen as “the Age of Ignorance” 
(Zakaria, 1991, 282), where people, like the Meccans before their acceptance of Islam, 
worshiped Idols. Jahiliyya is supposed to stand for barbarism, a time when lawlessness 
and idolatry were prevalent. In contrast to this, the establishment of Islam represents 
morality, enlightenment and divine law. Given that Sayyid Qutb’s use of the concept of 
jahiliyya forms the backbone of his argument in Signposts, the text that is central to the 
Muslim Brotherhood9, one can sense that the Hamas’s use of the term also carries the 
same weight. In fact, in article six the charter lays out the conditions that prevail in 
absence of Islam: 
In the absence of Islam, discord takes form, oppression and destruction are rampant, 
and wars and battles take place. The Muslim poet Muhammad Iqbal eloquently 
declares: When faith is lost there is no security not life for he who does not revive 
religion;/ And whoever is satisfied with life without religion then he would have let 
annihilation be his partner (Maqdasi, 124).
And the article nine depicts the prevailing conditions as:
8 Although in the version of charter that I am using, the author translates it as “ignorance”. But in two other 
translations that I have seen it is present as jahiliyya. The word is used in the article 19 in reference to the 
difference between the Islamic and non-Islamic art and the formers role in the “battle of liberation”.
9 Though this text is central to the Brotherhood’s ideological formation it was criticized by the clergy at Al-
Azhar (Kepel, 1984, 60). Even from within the ranks of the Brotherhood, Hudaybi, the Supreme Guard of 
the movement, in 1969 launched an indirect critique of Qutb’s labeling of the avowedly Islamic society as 
jahiliyya. It was indirect critique because Hudaybi, unable to directly challenged the status of the hallowed 
martyr that Qutb had become after his hanging by Nasser in 1966, challenged four important concepts 
found in the work of Mawdudi, on which Qutb based his work (Kepel, 1984, 61-64). 
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Values have deteriorated, plague if the evil folk and oppression and darkness have 
become rampant, cowards have become ferocious. Nations have been occupied, their 
people expelled and fallen on their faces [in humiliation] everywhere on earth. The 
nation of truth is absent and the nation of evil has been established; as long as Islam 
does not take its rightful place in the world arena everything will continue to change 
for the worse (Maqdasi, 125).
If for Qutb all the societies on the face of earth, even the avowedly Islamic ones, are 
jahiliyya, then would it be off the mark to argue that Hamas’s conception is not much 
different from the Brotherhood one? I for one think that it is arguably the same, but that 
Hamas is attuned to the context and thus more focused on the Palestine question.  
One of the conditions that Kelman specifies for the erosion of moral inhibition against 
violence involves the imposition of an ideological definition and indoctrinating against 
the targets of violence. “An ideology”, according to Ball and Dagger, “is a fairly coherent
and comprehensive set of ideas that explains and evaluates social conditions, helps 
people understand their place in society, and provides a program for social and political 
action” (1995, p.9). The imposition of ideological definition and other associated 
processes result in dehumanizing the target. If the target is reduced to something less than
humans, then violence against it becomes easier to accomplish. The targets are reduced to
animal like status and made it be irrational, thus lacking the very human faculty of 
reason. Dehumanization is best accomplished via setting up polar binaries and equating 
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one’s potential target with the negative part of the binary. Part of the process of 
constructing a symbolic environment that is conducive for deployment of political 
violence includes an effort to draw a neat and polar division between the believers and 
those who are considered to be the targets of violence. Given that all religions lay a claim
to what is proper behavior and what is not, leads to certain injunctions about proper 
behavior. There is almost an obsession in religions in specifying what is forbidden and 
what is allowed. Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori refer to this as “boundary setting” 
process (1996, 18). In Islam what is forbidden is denoted by haram. Haram also has the 
meaning of unclean. Hamas draws sharp distinction between Muslims and Jews by 
constantly referring to the Jews as impure. Given that Islam, same as other religions, also 
draws boundaries to designate what is permissible and what is forbidden, the designation 
of something as impure puts it beyond the pale. In the charter Jews are referred to as “the 
transgressors…[who stand for]…filth, impurity, and evil” (Maqdasi, 123). This equation 
of Jews with filth, impurity, and evil signifies what is beyond the pale. This equation of 
the Jews as a group with filth and impurity is part and parcel of the dehumanization. Even
worse, the equation of Jews with dirt and filth sets up the scenario for purification of the 
land from these supposed impurities. Thus, not only does this portrayal of Jews as 
impurities convey dehumanization, it also sets up the grounds for taking actions to 
remove these impurities.10
The dehumanization of Jews as a group does not stop with their equation with filth and 
impurity. The venomous attacks on the Jews continue, with Jews set up as the enemy. 
10 A very close parallel could be drawn with the way Nazi ideology portrayed the Jews. For the Nazis Jews 
represented impurities and as such were to be prevented from sexual relations with the Aryans, because if 
they had sexual relations with the Aryans the impurities will destroy the supposed superiority of the Aryans.
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Sometimes the Jews are referred as Jews while in other instances they are referred to as 
Zionists. Either way, these terms are used interchangeably. Given that non-Zionists Jews 
are also occupying the Muslim land, they are as much part of the group that is targeted by
Hamas. Extending the chain of dehumanization that begins with the equation of Jews 
with filth, the charter plays up on the stereotypical demeaning depictions of the Jews. 
Here the Jews are behind everything and anything, they are the scheming and clever. This
conspiratorial view of the Jews holds them responsible for a number of historical events 
that have not worked in the favor of Muslims. In article 22, The Power that Support the 
Enemy, Jews are held responsible for many influential political events in the world 
history:
With the money they ignited revolutions in all part of the world to realize their 
benefits and reap fruits of them. They are behind the French Revolution, the 
Communist Revolution, and most of the revolutions here and there which we have 
heard of and are hearing of. With wealth they formed secret organizations throughout 
the world to destroy societies and promote Zionist cause; these organizations include 
freemasons, the Rotary and Lions clubs, and others (129).
 It is not only that the Jews are portrayed as moneyed and powerful, they are also 
supposed to be behind every kind of political machination. The stress on Jews roles 
behind “most of the revolutions here and there” evokes the stereotypical idea of Jews as 
troublemakers. These instances parallel, if not completely than to the large extent, the 
way Nazis dehumanized the Jews. 
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Patriarchal notions that groups have about the role of “their” women are very influential 
in maintenance of boundaries between groups. In the Hamas charter there is not much 
doubt about the status of women. The Muslim woman here is conceived of as “the factory
of men” (127) and as one who takes “…care of the home and [raises] child of ethical 
character” (128). And given that the women are viewed through the patriarchal lenses, it 
is no surprise that the group claims the protection of the Muslim women as its duty. But 
who are the women to be protected from? Who else from if not from Jews! In article 17 
of the covenant, The Role of the Muslim Woman, a somewhat convoluted connection is 
made between the Jews and the moral corruption of Muslim women. The Jews, according
to this article, are behind the media and motion picture industry, and thereby keeping 
Muslim women away from Islam. These very same Jews are also using the education 
system to corrupt Muslim women. Through their control of teachers who are members of 
Zionist-sponsored “…[free] Masons, Rotary Clubs, intelligence networks, and other 
organizations” the Jews are directing the moral corruptness of Muslim women. 
A growing body, which usually stands as connection between life and growth, is used as a
metaphor for the way in which the depiction of Muslims versus Jews takes place in the 
charter. While Muslims are supposed to stand for life and growth, the Jews are depicted 
as death or in decay. On the very first page of the charter, the Muslims are exhorted as 
people of “the beat of believing hearts, immaculate arms” (122). In a few lines down 
from these descriptions the founding of Hamas is depicted as the growth of a seed (122). 
In contrast, the Jews are depicted as representing a disease that is afflicting the Islamic 
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body with fever (129). In certain other instances they are depicted as the cause of 
problems for Muslim bodies in other ways. They are, for instance, are said to be behind 
the drug and alcohol trade because they can ease the control [of supply] that they exercise
over the Palestinians (131).
The portrayal of history events is very important in establishing an authorization for 
violence in the charter. On one level the portrayal of historical events, especially those 
that either depict the construction of historical enemy (Jews in this case) or the evocation 
of history as memory, are important in situating the present in the past and in bringing the
past in to the present. Remembering this history thus serves a multitude of functions; 
primarily it places the past in the service of the present; and as the maxim has it, those 
who control the past control the present. The charter is based not only upon the general 
evocation of the past—glorious—history of Islam but also upon the scoping of specific 
events that are evoked to drive home certain points. The evocation of the history to lay 
claim to the land of Palestine is clearly present in the charter. In article 14, the charter 
states that “Palestine is an Islamic land accodmodating, the first Qibla, the third Holy 
Sanctuary, the [place where the] ascent of the messenger (saas) took place” (126). On one
level this evocation tries to remind the reader of the history and on another it constructs a 
solidarity based upon these historical events. The introduction of historical events in the 
charter leading to the authorization of violence is even more clearly present in revisit of 
the histories of the Crusades in the charter. 
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In the charter the history of Crusades is evoked very prominently. This history itself is 
very important because it reminds people that Palestine was occupied before, too—in the 
periods of Crusades—but the Muslims under the leadership of Salah al Din did set it free.
On the topic of the importance of the Crusades in the worldview of the Muslims and 
Arabs, Amin Maalouf in his The Crusades Through the Arab Eyes states that “it is often 
surprising to discover the extent to which the attitude of the Arabs (ands of Muslims in 
general) towards the West is still influenced, even today, by events that supposedly ended 
some seven centuries ago” (1984, 265). And “…Israel is regarded as a new Crusader 
state” (1984, 265). The focus on Crusades is, at times, coupled with the Tartar invasion. 
So, for instance, on two occasions, the charter refers to the Muslims defeat of the Tartar 
invasion. On page 131, the Muslims are depicted as having  “defeat[ed] the crusaders and
pushing back the Tartars and saving human civilization”. At another instance, the 
crusading west is paired with the Tartars invasion from the north (133). By remembering 
the Crusades the charter lays claim to carry the mantle of Salah al-Din, the Kurdish 
warrior responsible for the victory over the Franks (Franj). But remembering the 
Crusades serves another purpose: it provokes a sense of shame. Shame at what was done 
to them.
In social psychology an interesting literature exists on the connections between shame 
and aggression (Scheff, 2002). Sometimes referred to as the shame/aggression complex, 
this literature draws attention to the fact that most of the violence is done by men and 
comes from a feeling of shame, a shame that flows from humiliation endured or felt. This
feeling of shame is converted into a “humiliated fury” that is used to overcome the 
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feeling of powerlessness and weakness and that men are not taught to never acknowledge
as part of their socialization. The only way to get rid of the shame is to use the 
“humiliated fury” to get rid of the source of shame—the Other who rejects the self and is 
thus responsible for the shame. In the Hamas charter, history is used to remind the 
Muslims of their collective shame, a shame that comes from having lost the wars and 
land to Israel. In many instances the Israelis are referred to as Nazi Jews and are held 
responsible for the humiliation heaped at them. So, for instance, in article 28, the charter 
revisits this history of humiliation: “We shouldn’t lose this opportunity to remind every 
Muslim that when the Jews occupied immaculate Jerusalem in 1967 they stood on the 
stairs of the blessed Masjid al-Aqsa loudly chanting: ‘Muhammad has died and left girls 
behind’” (131). In a patriarchal culture, nothing is worse for men than to be compared 
with girls11. Colonialism and imperialism, from which the Muslim have suffered from in 
the last few centuries, are presented as sources of humiliation in the charter (127).
Left at the level of in individual the shame will not be that bad, but if there is a collective 
sense of shame then it become even more furious. This is because collective memory 
gives shape to people's lives and provides not only a base from which individuals can 
look back and explain their experiences and actions, but also a platform on which to build
and guide the future (Selbin, 1997). A sense of collective shame and humiliation 
combined with a program that claims to know the unfolding of history—as captured in 
article 34: “There is no doubt in the truth of the historical evidence which is a pattern of 
the universe and a law of nature…and in the end the victory is for truth (133)—makes it 
11 Mark Juergensmeyer talks about the concept of “warriors power” in this context (2000, 187). Michael 
Ignatieff uses the term “warrior’s honor” to denote the “idea of war as moral theater in which one displayed
one’s manly virtues in public (1997, 117). Masculinity at its peak reaches the image of a warrior in many 
cultures. Comparing a warrior to a girl means the deepest form of humiliation.
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easier for people to use violence “to short-circuit” the course of events and lead them to 
what they consider to be the end. This even becomes easier if a program has been laid out
for them and if this program holds promises for their deeds not only in this world but also
in the next one.
The concepts of jihad and martyrdom in the charter provide for this possibility12. Jihad is 
an oft-misrepresented term, but it is true that one interpretation of jihad certainly deals 
with the use of force and violence. There are two types of jihad: the greater one, which is 
the spiritual struggle of each individual against vice, passion and ignorance; and the 
smaller one, which involves the use of force to maintain Islamic social system and justice
(Hashmi, 1998, 425). Muslim legal scholars have divided the world into two spheres: 
Dar al-Islam (land of Islam) and Dar al-Harb (land of war). It was the responsibility of 
Muslim to convert—by peaceful means if possible, or by force if necessary—the Dar al-
Harb into Dar al-Islam. In the recent past the translation of jihad as “holy war” has 
gained widespread currency in the West. In the Hamas charter, jihad is used many times. 
According to article 13 of the charter, “There is no solution to the Palestinian problem 
except by jihad” (126). The aim of Hamas, according to the article seven of the charter, is
to “…link in [a long] chain of Jihad against the Zionist occupation…” (124).
Given that smaller jihad cannot be waged without the chance of losing one’s life, the 
concept of martyrdom and death in Islam and their deployment in the charter become 
very important. One of the most striking features is the way charter evokes memories of 
12 Milton-Edwards (1992, 50) makes clear in her article on Hamas that its use of jihad as a concept is 
attuned to the political context of the Palestinian conflict. In equating jihad with the Palestinian 
nationalistic struggle, Hamas breaks with Qutb’s injunction to not limit jihad to either just self-defense or 
any territory.
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martyrs (shahids). In the beginning sentences of the charter, there is a quote from 
“martyred Imam Hasan al-Banna” (122) and then there is the evocation of “Martyr ‘Izz 
al-Din al-Qassam and his mujahid brothers [who]…in 1936…initiat[ed] the jihad (124). 
It bears reminding here that al-Qassam, who began a “jihad…against the British and their
Zionists clients…[as] the only means of removing invaders from Arab Palestine” 
(Johnson, 1982, 40), died as a martyr in 1936. His death had a large impact on the 
Muslims in Palestine in the following years—and his memory is revered within the larger
collective memory. Related to martyrdom is the issue of how death is viewed in Islam. 
According to B. Todd Lawson, “The Islamic ideal of martyrdom can be thought to be the 
logical adjunct to the overall Qur’anic view of death as illusory” (55). These elements 
combined with ideas about suffering, redemption and sacrifice take on a form that is more
conducive, although the exact conditions still remain out of our knowledge, for their 
deployment for political violence13.
 
Conclusion
Taking the case of Hamas charter, and tracing its foundation and ideological development
based upon its background connections with the Muslim Brotherhood, I have argued 
using the framework developed by Herbert Kelman (with a slight modification) in this 
paper that the process via which political violence becomes justified involves three 
processes: authorization, dehumanization and shame. All these three elements are 
constructed in the case of the Hamas charter via the reinterpretation of history and 
13 These sentiments are captured in Hamas’s slogans printed on stickers produced by the movement: “The 
call of Jerusalem is for Muslims to fight. With stones and blood we will liberate the land of the night 
journey” (Milton-Edwards, 1992, 51). 
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memory. This specific reinterpretation—putting the past in the service of the present—
draws upon elements of suffering, redemption, martyrdom and overcoming enemies from
the Islamic history. Although there are many other sources of political violence, there is 
none as deep reaching in its appeal as the religious-based appeal for the deployment of 
violence. These “cosmic wars”, to use Juergensmeyer’s term, will live with us forever 
because the human search for meaning in life—that is, religion—will always stay with 
us. Because religions, furthermore, provide guidance about moral life and thus try to 
chalk out what is just and unjust, this means that in so far as injustice prevails, religion 
will be used in fighting this injustice. And part of this always will be violent.
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